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The Second Opinion: 
Religion, Democracy, and Community
Andy Ver Steegh
I. Introduction
Should there be a role for religious discourse in public deliberation?1 
Answers to this question fall along a continuum. On one pole, there are 
those who say “No, religious reasoning has no place in the delibera-
tions of a secular republic.” In this view, not only are the contributions 
of religion to public debate dubious at best, religious reasoning harms 
the cohesive fabric necessary for our political community to function 
as a democracy. On the opposite pole are those who claim the United 
States as a Christian nation whose identity is inextricably linked with 
Christianity. They demand, therefore, the presence of a specific reli-
gion’s type of reasoning in public deliberation; the health of the Repub-
lic necessitates a Christian public sphere. In this essay, I engage with 
the secular pole of this continuum in the interest of making a case for 
religious discourse in the deliberations of a secular Republic.
I argue that religious reasoning is a beneficial feature of democratic 
deliberation because it brings in an outsider’s perspective. It functions 
as an “alien discourse.”2 Stated differently, because religious reason-
ing is distinct from secular public reasoning, it can provide a valuable 
alternative view on the state of our collective public life.3 As this per-
spective interacts with American public life, I characterize it as forming 
something of a “second opinion.”
To explicate the phenomenon of religious reasoning, I draw on The 
Myth of a Christian Nation, by Gregory Boyd, and The Great Awakening, 
by Jim Wallis. These works are recent examples of normative thought 
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on the intersection of religion and politics coming from within evan-
gelical communities. These two authors draw on a long theological 
tradition of understanding Christians in America as a community of 
“resident aliens,” as outsiders in the modern world able to access a 
religious space fundamentally different from the here-and-now. This 
is not, of course, the only theological vision of how Christians should 
interact with the world, but it is one that is garnering increasing atten-
tion and represents a cutting edge of normative theory from within 
evangelical communities. I emphasize the obvious point that “Evan-
gelical Christianity” does not represent “Christianity,” and “Christian-
ity” is not a synonym for “religion.” Although recognizing this, for the 
sake of the essay’s flow, my usage of these terms is somewhat inter-
changeable. I do not mean to substantially conflate them.
To characterize the concept of secular reason I draw on the work 
of John Rawls and Richard Rorty. Here, I focus both on their stances 
regarding the introduction of religious reasoning in public delibera-
tion and the underlying values that this viewpoint seeks to protect. In 
this vision, the religious community is digested by the secular public 
reason; religion is only allowed on secular terms. The animating con-
cern is defense of the democratic community—the creation of an acces-
sible and viable public sphere.
The thesis of this article is not new. However, as we renegotiate the 
boundaries of religiosity in the public square post-Bush, I believe that 
investigating the relationship of religion and public life with reference 
to evangelical thought is particularly timely.
I begin my discussion by explicating the worldview found in The 
Great Awakening and The Myth of a Christian Nation. Through these two 
recent examples, I develop the idea of religion as an alien discourse, 
using a powerful vision coming from within Christian theology as 
an example. In the next section, I turn to the public sphere. Draw-
ing on the work of John Rawls, I characterize the idealized vision of 
public democratic life that we all share as a community that seeks to 
digest religious reasoning. In other words, to the extent that religion is 
made public, it must become secularized. Examining recent poll data, 
I emphasize that this is simply impractical. I conclude by going one 
step further, arguing that the presence of alien discourse in our public 
life is both politically ambiguous (in partisan terms) and ultimately 
beneficial.
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II. Religious Communities, Secular World
Two pastors have recently taken stock of the intersection of faith and 
politics in light of the Bush years.4 Jim Wallis, a best-selling author and 
public religious intellectual, published The Great Awakening in 2008.5 
With a foreword by Jimmy Carter, he takes direct aim at the close asso-
ciation of evangelicalism and Republican electoral strategy: “People 
know now that God is neither a Republican nor a Democrat, and we 
are all learning that religion is not supposed to be in the pocket of 
any political party, but rather calls them all to moral accountability.”6 
Throughout this book, Wallis writes to a very broad slice of the Ameri-
can public, outlining a new evangelical social and political agenda 
that directly confronts the detrimental involvement of the evangelical 
church in partisan politics.
From a different perspective comes Gregory Boyd’s 2005 work, The 
Myth of a Christian Nation.7 A pastor in St. Paul, Minnesota, Boyd exam-
ined the religious-political alliance during the 2004 election season and 
attracted national attention for the controversy caused within his own 
congregation.8 Boyd’s argument is theologically intense, based on a 
specific interpretation of scripture, and enmeshed in a comprehensive 
political cosmology. His thesis is straightforward: “I believe many of 
us American evangelicals have allowed our understanding of the king-
dom of God to be polluted with political ideals, agendas, and issues.”9 
The church should get out of partisan politics, but more importantly, 
partisan politics should get out of the church.
My focus is not on specific theological, moral, or political ideas that 
either of these authors may or may not advocate. In this essay I am 
not taking a stand on any political or policy issues, and I am certainly 
not a theologian. My focus, rather, is on how these two authors reason. 
How does their identity as persons of faith inflect their method of 
argument? Despite their different audiences and theses, both Boyd and 
Wallis construct their Christianities as a moral standard that is alien 
to modern politics. That is, people of faith are—and should be—on the 
outside looking in.
A. Myth of a Christian Nation
In Boyd’s conception, the identity of being a Christian and the identity 
of being an American could not be more different. Drawing on the 
actions of Jesus, Boyd conceives of a fundamental dividing line split-
3
Ver Steegh: seocnd opinion
Published by DigitalCommons@Macalester College, 2009
Civic Forum 2009
92
ting the cosmos into the kingdom of the world (also called the kingdom of 
the sword) and the kingdom of God (also called the kingdom of the cross). 
The governments of this world, the civil authority that is the bedrock of 
the modern constitutional state, are “kingdoms of the world,” defined 
by a specific relationship to power. “Kingdoms of the world” exercise 
power over others through coercion and control. They are backed up by 
a monopoly on violence. As he states:
Wherever a person or group exercises power over others…there is a ver-
sion of the kingdom of the world. While it comes in many forms, the 
kingdom of the world is in essence a ‘power over’ kingdom. In some ver-
sions—such as America—subjects have a say in who their rulers will be, 
while in others they have none. In some versions, subjects may influence 
how their rulers exercise power over them—for example, what laws they 
will live by—while in others they do not. There have been democratic, 
socialist, communist, fascist, and totalitarian versions of the kingdom of 
the world, but they all share this distinctive characteristic: they exercise 
‘power over’ people.10
The laws of temporal governments, no matter how just or democratic, 
regressive or totalitarian, fundamentally rely on force (or the threat of 
force) to keep the peace and enforce their will.11 Power comes from the 
top down. In the broader sweep of Boyd’s cosmology, the kingdoms of 
the world have no inherent value; they are instruments used to further 
the Divine Will and to the extent that they promote law and order, they 
are good.12 However, he says, we must remember that “power over” is 
the method of a fallen world and thus, “Functionally, Satan is the act-
ing CEO of all earthly governments.”13
In contrast to this earthly vision of fallen power stands the kingdom 
of God, embodied in the person and actions of Jesus Christ. It exercises 
a fundamentally different type of power (if it can be termed power 
in the conventional sense at all): “The kingdom of God advances by 
people lovingly placing themselves under others, in service to others, at 
cost to themselves.”14 He continues:
The character and rule of God is manifested when instead of employing 
violence against his enemies to crush them, Jesus loves his enemies in 
order to redeem them. The kingdom is revealed when instead of protect-
ing himself, Jesus allows himself to be murdered. God’s love is marvel-
ously put on display when instead of clinging to his perfect holiness, 
Jesus puts himself in the place of sinners.15
4
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Following the example of Jesus, Boyd argues, it is incumbent on faith-
ful Christians to commit their lives to a radical “power under” ethic of 
transformational service, not because it will “secure a good outcome” 
by any societal or political measure, but rather because this is what it 
means to be a Christian.16
How is this ethic transformational? Through their “power under” 
actions, Christians stand as an example against the fallen notions of 
worldly revenge and “us vs. them” retaliation17: “When we respond 
to violence with violence, whether it be physical, verbal, or attitu-
dinal, we legitimize the violence of our enemy and sink to his level. 
When we instead respond unexpectedly—offering our other cheek and 
going a second mile—we reveal, even as we expose the injustice of his 
actions, that our nemesis doesn’t have the power to define us by those 
actions.”18 The example of Christ cannot be digested or appropriated 
by the kingdom of the sword.
Indeed, the world that members of the kingdom of God should 
aspire to turns all conventional definitions and boundaries inside out 
through the radical mechanism of “power under” living:
The kingdom of the world is intrinsically tribal in nature, and is heavily 
invested in defending, if not advancing, one’s own people-group, one’s 
nation, one’s ethnicity, one’s state, one’s religion, one’s ideologies, or one’s 
political agendas. That is why it is a kingdom characterized by perpetual 
conflict. The kingdom of God, however, is intrinsically universal, for it is 
centered on simply loving as God loves. It is centered on people living 
for the sole purpose of replicating the love of Jesus Christ to all people 
at all times in all places without condition. The kingdom-of-God partici-
pant has by love transcended the tribal and nationalistic parameters of 
whatever version of the kingdom of the world they find themselves in.19
As Boyd puts it, “Jesus didn’t buy into the limited options the culture 
placed before him. He rather exposed ugly injustices in all kingdom-
of-the-world options by offering a radically distinct alternative.”20 In 
Boyd’s view, to be a Christian—to be a follower of Christ—is to be a 
member of a community that has a fundamentally different world-
view, a fundamentally different understanding of how to be in the 
world, and to possess, by earthly standards, a fundamentally different 
relationship to power. To be a member of the kingdom of God, further, 
is only incidentally political because to live in the path of Christ is an 
imperative from a different world, and that imperative understands 
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the power of this world as something instrumental and subservient to 
a higher community.
B. The Great Awakening
The relationship of the community of Christ to the community of 
Americans is couched in much different terms for Wallis in The Great 
Awakening. The concept, however, is similar. Wallis constructs a vision 
of the Christian community as “countercultural,” as using the life of 
Jesus Christ to bear witness to temporal injustice.
“The church,” Wallis writes, “must…offer an alternative view of 
the world, an alternative narrative of cultural values, an alternative 
model for human existence, and an alternative vision for politics” that 
would stand in contrast to the injustices of business as usual.21 Politi-
cal stands through adherence to the example of Jesus are unavoidable, 
because Jesus himself was a political figure: “For the early Christians, 
and for us, to say that ‘Jesus is Lord’ is a profoundly political state-
ment. It means that nobody else is Lord, including Caesar and the 
Roman Empire, our own political rulers, and the totalitarian claims of 
any state or empire.”22 He continues:
The early Christians were actually accused of ‘atheism’ because they 
rejected the gods of the Roman world. One wonders whether our 
churches today would be so accused for rejecting the modern gods of 
our consumer culture and market economy, or the political patriotism 
of the American superpower. The problem comes when the church is so 
conformed to the values of the world that it offers no real alternative to 
the ruling societal values and has virtually nothing to say to the world’s 
cultural norms or political ethics. It’s when the church becomes a mere 
thermometer that takes the temperature of the world and adjusts accord-
ingly, instead of a thermostat that actually changes the social tempera-
ture.23
To be a Christian, for Wallis, is to be a world apart. Wallis phrases this 
idea in very direct terms: “Here’s an insight that is fundamental, and 
yet profoundly obvious: we are to be Christians first and citizens of our 
country second—not the other way around.”24 This is not an injunction 
to abandon our American political community:
For Christians, people are always more important than causes. That’s 
why human rights, in the face of regimes that regularly violate those 
Civic Forum 2009
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rights in the name of ideology and the state, have often been so impor-
tant to communities of faith. Rather than seeking to construct perfect 
social orders, which are impossible, we should instead seek concrete 
reforms of the actual social situations and circumstance in which the 
church finds itself.25
This ethic of engagement “invites us to the very social participation 
that societies and states need, evaluating them by a specific set of 
standards outside of themselves. Not to engage is to accept the status 
quo.”26 On a communal level, the function of the church in the modern 
state is to be “the conscience of the state, holding it accountable for 
upholding justice and restraining its violence.”27
As Wallis articulated above, the example of Christ, in modern par-
tisan terms, is ambiguous: “religion and public life” does not mean 
“conservative Christians and Republicans.” The issues that Wallis 
identifies as being the objects of Christian ethical imperatives do not 
adhere to any electoral agenda. Wallis writes about a laundry list of 
issues, including poverty (both domestic and global); climate change; 
race (focusing on the legacy of slavery and white privilege); class; 
gender; immigration; the sanctity of human life that underpins many 
issues including abortion, genocide, torture, and human trafficking; 
rethinking a pro-family stance; and the use of force abroad.
In both of these accounts of contemporary Christian evangelical 
communities, to be a Christian is to be out of step with the modern 
world. “We must always remember,” writes Boyd, “that we are ‘resi-
dent aliens’ in this oppressed world, soldiers of the kingdom of God 
stationed behind enemy lines with a unique, all consuming, holy call-
ing on our life. We are called, individually and corporately, to look like 
Jesus to a rebellious, self-centered, and violent world.”28 Through the 
emulation of Christ, the fallen world can be transformed.
III. Secular World, Religious Communities
Having detailed two examples of the use of Christianity as an alien 
discourse, I now focus on the second half of this normative equation: 
public life.
The American public sphere creates its own type of community 
(against which religion can be considered “alien”) and its own ideal 
of how we should reason together. It is not a neutral space where we 
come together as atomized individuals, but rather a community unto 
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itself. In what follows, I sketch out the general boundaries of the public 
sphere. Second, I identify the defining characteristics of the kind of dis-
cursive community that is considered the secular ideal-type of how we 
should collectively reason. This ideal-type is deeply suspicious of pub-
lic religious reasoning. Third, I point to recent poll data indicating that 
our moral/ethical worldviews are a conglomerate of a variety of influ-
ences. It is simply impractical to expect that we enter the public sphere 
as monolithic beings animated only by pure reason. To conclude the 
essay, I go one step further by arguing that aside from questions of 
practicality, having our democratic deliberations “polluted” by forms 
of alien discourse is a good thing, provided, of course, that delibera-
tion occurs within a democratic context.
A. The Public Sphere
Following in the tradition of one of the most prominent theorists of 
public life, Jurgen Habermas, Nancy Fraser defines the public sphere 
as “the space in which citizens deliberate about their common affairs, 
hence, an institutionalized arena of discursive interaction. This arena is 
conceptually distinct from the state; it is a site for the production and 
circulation of discourses that can in principle be critical of the state.”29 
Through this common deliberation, we become, as Stout puts it, a 
“community of reason-givers.”30 The question is what kind of reasons 
should we give?
While the public sphere is indeed separate from the state, the two 
are highly articulated. The philosophy of secular constitutional liber-
alism, which underpins the legal separation of American church and 
state, also (to a greater or lesser degree) anchors the American public 
sphere, which is nominally secular.
Anchored by the legal principle of the separation of church and 
state, many would see the further separation of explicitly religious 
reasoning and political reasoning in the public sphere as beneficial and 
good. This view is articulated by in one of the most prominent philoso-
phers of our time, John Rawls. In The Idea of Public Reason Revisited, he 
writes that religion “may be introduced in public political discussions 
at any time, provided that in due course proper political reasons…are 
presented that are sufficient to support whatever the comprehensive 
doctrines [religious doctrines] introduced are said to support.”31 While 
Rawls notes that people engaged in debate using religious justification 
will have natural incentives to “make their views acceptable to a broad 
Civic Forum 2009
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audience,” this is not a point that is left open to natural dynamics.32 
For Rawls, the only legitimate religious reason is one that could also 
be a secular reason, and will eventually be transformed into one.33 In 
this view, there is an ethical mandate for the secularization of religious 
reason.
The function of this “proviso” (as he calls it) is to preserve the iden-
tity of the public community and the type of reason it engenders. 
Alien discourse detracts from the strength and vibrancy of democratic 
political debate, with potentially detrimental consequences, and our 
first allegiance as public actors is to the secular community that we all 
share. Religious reasoning must essentially become secular reasoning 
to ethically enter the public sphere. Religion can only matter to the 
extent that it is secular. The “otherness” of religious reasoning—a fea-
ture that I argue makes religious communities so valuable to a secular 
democracy—is in this view precisely the reason why religious public 
reasoning is detrimental to our public life. This alien discourse should 
not compete against the already tenuous bonds we have as a demo-
cratic community.
This fundamental interest, the defense of the democratic community, 
is also given voice by Richard Rorty. “The main reason religion needs 
to be privatized,” he writes, “is that, in political discussion with those 
outside the relevant religious community, it is a conversation-stop-
per.”34 The particularity of religious reason and language is here again 
gnawing away at the fabric of democratic life. In this view, democracy 
works because we all come together on co-equal terms; religious rea-
soning undermines this egalitarian accessibility to our shared delibera-
tions.
As a recent survey by The Pew Forum on Religion and Public Life 
states: “A majority of adults (56%) say religion is very important in 
their lives, and more than eight-in-ten (82%) say it is at least somewhat 
important.”35 On a practical level, entering the public sphere think-
ing only as secular, rational agents is not tenable. When we enter the 
public sphere, we do so as individuals with a complex mix of beliefs, 
identities, and personal experiences. A person’s worldview, the frame-
work used to make sense of public life, is not formed solely by one 
conviction, nor does one aspect of a person necessarily always enjoy 
interpretative primacy. If recent poll data is any indication, religion—
predominantly some form of Christianity—is an important aspect of 
many Americans’ worldviews.
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Data further indicates that Americans experience the injunctions of 
religious teaching on morality as part of a broader mixture of influ-
ences that color “walking around” notions of right and wrong:
Americans demonstrate a practical bent when it comes to the sources 
to which they look for guidance on such matters. Roughly three-in-ten 
(29%) cite religious teachings and beliefs as their biggest influence, but 
a slim majority of the public (52%) says that they look most to practical 
experience and common sense when it comes to questions of right and 
wrong.36
In very broad strokes, religion matters to Americans, but not in 
an exclusive way. Our moral-ethical worldview features a variety of 
influences, some formally religious and others based in the here-and-
now: “Although the U.S. is a highly religious country, Americans are 
not dogmatic.”37 The United States is home to a pantheon of religious 
identities: “Whatever we once were, we are no longer just a Christian 
nation; we are also a Jewish nation, a Muslim nation, a Buddhist nation, 
a Hindu nation, and a nation of nonbelievers.”38 In the two examples 
of normative Christian thought presented above, to be a Christian is 
to be embedded in contemporary life as an outsider. This is a specific 
example, perhaps, but it does not seem unreasonable to posit that, on 
some level, we have within ourselves (and more broadly within the 
United States) a multitude of alien discourses.
IV. Conclusion
I have characterized religion (using examples from within evangelical 
Christianity) as a form of alien discourse vis-à-vis the type of communal 
reasoning theorized for the secular public sphere. I have argued that, in 
a practical sense, religion will continue to be a prominent actor in the 
public sphere for the time being. Rather than being a brute statistical 
fact, however, the alien discourse of religious reason has an inherent 
benefit: it functions as a second opinion. The type of religious think-
ing found in Boyd and Wallis provides a normative vision for what a 
just world looks like, and moral and ethical guidelines for how to get 
there from here based on an ancient text and an ancient life. If one of 
the main features of our shared public life is to get together and debate 
the values that should underpin our public policy at home and abroad, 
to forge a vision of what life in the United States should be, then how 
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is having more input a bad thing? It seems to me that when it comes to 
finding a way forward in political life, “the more the merrier.”
The underlying interest that I take secularists (represented here 
by Rawls and Rorty) to be defending is this: religious reasoning will 
harm the cohesive fabric that creates the possibility for democratic 
deliberation in the first place. Religious reasoning shatters egalitarian 
accessibility to the public sphere. This interest is a fundamental one. 
Democracy does not just happen. We have to make it happen. By way 
of conclusion, I want to address this interest.
As a result of appealing to a broad population that holds highly 
heterodox views, what is likely to happen is a process of translation.39 
Translation is a dynamic that will occur naturally for a very simple rea-
son: Christian language will not be convincing to all, or even a major-
ity, of the American public, because not all of us are Christian, and all 
of the Christians do not share the same Christianity. To further a politi-
cal agenda, advocates will have to appeal to a diverse (and sometimes 
hostile) public. Theoretically, however, Rawls seeks to stop religious 
reasoning at the water’s edge. Any type of argument that relies on reli-
gious premises must be collapsed into secular terms.
One person’s religious justification for her political beliefs does not 
threaten my secular justifications for my political beliefs. In fact, our 
democratic life is best served when everybody is open and honest 
about the real justifications they hold for their beliefs. As Stout puts it: 
“If a large segment of the citizenry is in fact relying on religious prem-
ises when making political decisions, it behooves all of us to know 
what those premises are. Premises left unexpressed are often premises 
left unchallenged.”40 Our political beliefs are oftentimes either explic-
itly religious or firmly grounded in religious belief. No one is under 
any obligation to be convinced by religious appeals, but that does 
not make them illegitimate. Public life benefits not from restricting 
the types of reason that can and cannot be legitimately proffered, but 
rather by rigorously and critically interrogating all public viewpoints. 
This is the function that makes democratic life tick.
Regardless of the language in which speech is eventually made pub-
lic (and it should be left to the discretion of the speaker), religious 
communities are powerful sites for critical reflection on the state of the 
modern world. Through bringing in such an outside perspective, pub-
lic debate is enriched.
11
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Notes
1. I would like to thank Aurora Sekine ’09, Brian Stephenson ’10, and Johan Lorenzen 
’09 for reading and providing feedback on various drafts of this paper. All errors are my 
own.
2. I first encountered the phrase “alien discourse” in Martha Minow, “Religions and Pub-
lic Life: Problems of Translation,” in Debating the Divine: Religion in 21st Century American 
Democracy, edited by Sally Steenland (Washington, D.C.: Center for American Progress, 
2008). While my usage has substantial overlap with hers, this term also resonates with 
the language used by the evangelical writers examined here.
3. Answering these questions of ought rests on developing visions of two big concepts 
(religion and public life) and then providing an outline of how they should ideally interact. 
These two categories are hotly contested and any expansive definition is sure to gloss 
over important nuances. What do I mean by “public life”? In terms of public life, we 
have a tendency to analytically conflate three distinct, yet highly articulated, realms: 
the public sphere, electoral politics, and the administrative structures of the state. Due 
to space constraints, I will not address the relationship of church and state in American 
law or history. Suffice it to say, I take an officially secular state as a given. I understand 
the public sphere as the site of “discursive practices of ethical deliberation and political 
debate” where we, as democratic individuals, exchange reasons and justifications, and 
become a “community of reason-givers.” See Jeffrey Stout, Democracy and Tradition, New 
Forum Books (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2004), p. 293. Quite simply, the 
public sphere is where we get together and talk things out.
4. My selection of these two works is somewhat arbitrary. However, these two books are 
serious attempts from a religious perspective to negotiate the contemporary boundaries 
of American public life.
5. Jim Wallis, The Great Awakening: Reviving Faith and Politics in a Post-Religious Right 
America (New York: HarperOne, 2008).
6. Ibid., p. 5.
7. Gregory A. Boyd, The Myth of a Christian Nation: How the Quest for Political Power is 
Destroying the Church (Grand Rapids, Mich.: Zondervan, 2005).
8. Laurie Goodstein, “Disowning Conservative Politics, Evangelical Pastor Rattles Flock,” 
New York Times (30 July 2006).
9. Boyd 2005, p. 11.
10. Ibid., p. 18.
11. Weber would find little to disagree with in this formulation.
12. Boyd 2005, p. 22.
13. Ibid.
14. Ibid., p. 31.
15. Ibid., p. 34.
16. Ibid., p. 43.
17. Ibid., p. 24.
18. Ibid., p. 40.
19. Ibid., p. 47.
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20. Ibid., p. 120.
21. Wallis 2008, p. 64.
22. Ibid., p. 65.
23. Ibid.
24. Ibid., p. 75.
25. Ibid., p. 67.
26. Ibid., p. 68.
27. Ibid., p. 70.
28. Boyd 2005, p. 85.
29. Nancy Fraser, “Was There Ever a Public Sphere? If So, When? Reflections on the 
American Case,” in Habermas and the Public Sphere: Studies in Contemporary German Social 
Thought, edited by Craig J. Calhoun (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1992), p. 110.
30. Stout 2004, p. 293.
31. John Rawls, The Law of Peoples: with “The Idea of Public Reason Revisited” (Cambridge, 
Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1999), p. 152.
32. Ibid., p. 153.
33. Indeed, Rawls subsequently asks of his proviso: “when does it need to be satisfied? 
On the same day or some later day?…” (p. 153).
34. Richard Rorty, Philosophy and Social Hope (New York: Penguin Books, 1999), p. 171.
35. The Pew Forum on Religion and Public Life, and Pew Research Center. U.S. Religious 
Landscape Survey, 2008 (Washington, D.C.: Pew Research Center, 2008). Accessed online 
at http://religions.pewforum.org/reports, 22.
36. Ibid., p. 62.
37. Ibid., p. 21.
38. Barack Obama, The Audacity of Hope: Thoughts on Reclaiming the American Dream (New 
York: Crown Publishers, 2006), p. 218. I thank Aurora Sekine ’09 for pointing out this 
quotation.
39. See especially Minow 2008.
40. Jeffrey Stout, quoted in Minow 2008, p. 38.
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